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Pluralism in action. Although the traditional platonist view of an immutable set re-
ality waiting for discovery may still be implicitly dominant, in recent years a more
pluralist perspective has gained ground. This development is not only a reaction to the
wave of independence results obtained since the sixties, but also reflects the persisting
difficulties to settle specific questions, like the continuum hypothesis, by adding more
or less well motivated set-theoretic assumptions, e.g. large cardinal, determinacy, or
forcing axioms. Pluralists assume that the topic of set theory is not some canonical,
ontologically questionable “real” universe, but a multiverse, a multiplicity of possible
universes, like suitable models of some basic set-theoretic axioms. The main goal is
to investigate the properties and the diversity of its members, together with their rela-
tionships. Pluralism itself is pluralist - it may reflect ontological commitments, like the
rejection of a realist philosophy, or epistemological modesty paying tribute to recog-
nized limitations of meta-mathematical inquiry.
However, independently from philosophical attitudes, the multiverse paradigm of-
fers a powerful methodological tool for investigating the conceptual foundations of set
theory by guiding the search for and the evaluation of new axioms. This is the idea
behind Friedman’s pragmatic but systematic Hyperuniverse Program (HUP)1, which
tries to rely on objectively justifiable mechanisms for determining new axioms. In fact,
a missing set heaven doesn’t preclude a progressive, well-orchestrated addition of new
reasonable set-theoretic commitments, reflecting the evolution of mathematical prac-
tice, knowledge, and needs. And even Platonism needs an effective exploration strategy
to pass beyond the stage of vague or fortuitous insights.
Friedman’s HyperuniverseH consists of all the countable transitive models of ZFC,
witnessing all the commonly discussed axioms (assuming consistency). This multi-
verse, taking advantage of the Loewenheim-Skolem theorem, may be considered unbi-
ased in the context of first-order ZFC and is closed under all the common model con-
structions. The goal is to identify preferred universes whose shared consequences may
then point towards new reasonable axiom candidates. More concretely, one considers
general, intuitively appealing set-theoretical principles, like Maximality, and uses them
to induce formal criteria over H, like variants and combinations of horizontal/power
set and vertical maximality. The resulting constraints, insofar compatible with set-
theoretic practice (e.g. the consistency of relevant large cardinal concepts), can then be
exploited to specify a collection of preferred universes Hpr whose theory is meant to
justify or filter out axioms.
1S. Friedman, T. Arragoni. The Hyperuniverse Program. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic: 19(1):77-96, 2013.
A formal framework for axiom induction The goal of the present work is to develop
an abstract inferential framework inspired by the HUP whose inference method in-
stantiations may be used for identifying new set-theoretic axioms, and in addition, can
themselves be compared and evaluated. The idea is to investigate natural parametrized
“inductive” inference relations |∼∈ which associate with any suitable axiom system Σ,
usually ZFC+X for recursive X , reasonable candidates for new set-theoretic axioms
or truths. To specify such a |∼∈ we can use as parameters formal specifications of
the multiverse, of set-theoretic beliefs/demands, and of philosophical/methodological
desiderata. Rationality postulates for the inference relations and their parameters may
then offer additional criteria for judging axiom generation, transcending the HUP.
Axiom induction is meant to extend a given axiom system Σ, known to provide
only a partial description of some topic of interest, by plausible new axiom candidates.
The completion of axiomatic set theories by large cardinal axioms may be the most
prominent example. Let L = L(∈) be the first-order language for set-theory and `
be classical first-order inference. The central concept is that of an inference relation
|∼∈∆ ⊆ 2L × L linking an initial collection of accepted set-theoretic axioms Σ to pre-
sumably reasonable set-theoretic constraints or axiom candidates. The parameter ∆
encodes additional information about the multiverse, mathematical practice, or philo-
sophical/technical/practical desiderata. The general scheme is thus Σ |∼∈∆ ψ.
Let us take a look at possible basic ingredients on the input/output side. In prac-
tice, a multiverse like H has to be anchored in a set-theoretic environment S = (S,∈).
While a genuinely pluralist perspective may prefer weak conditions, in the context of
axiom induction for ZFC, the reference to set-theoretic practice requires strong con-
sistency assumptions so that minimalism seems impractical and misguided. Let Γ ⊆ L
be the collection of axioms - or more generally, a collection of axiom sets - transcending
ZFC (large cardinals, forcing, determinacy, constructibility, ...) considered relevant,
and thus to be instantiated in the multiverse. For each γ ∈ Γ, let γ+ express the exis-
tence of a transitive model of ZF +γ and let Γ+ = {γ+ | γ ∈ Γ}. Note that we do not
ask Γ to be consistent with ZFC. There may be incompatible but a priori individually
justifiable axiomatic choices, at least realizable in inner models (like the inner model
hypothesis and “∃ inaccessible cardinals”, or ZFC and AD). Hence, if Tˆ ⊆ L denotes
the conditions imposed upon S, to ensure the existence of a rich and axiom-induction-
friendly multiverse, we stipulate the consistency of ZFC ∪Γ+ ⊆ Tˆ . S |= Tˆ figures as
an implicit background universe hosting the transitive sets representing the universes
meant to populate the multiverse.
In the context of S |= Tˆ and a reference axiom system Σ = ZFC+X , a multiverse
MV is a set/class of transitive set models of Σ, called universes, defined by a formula
(set) ΦMV. We impose Σ-Representativity, i.e. every theory realized by a model of Σ
in S has to be realized in MV as well, and Σ-closure, i.e. for each universe in MV,
all its inner Σ-models are also in MV. Because we seek a general framework able to
handle also axioms formulated in infinitary or higher-order languages, we cannot just
focus on countable transitive models, as Friedman’s Hyperuniverse does. To honour
the universality and unity of set theory, we also require Directedness: for all universes
M1,M2, there is an universe M with M1 ∪M2 ⊆M . The hyperuniverseH, which we
would tend to consider the minimal reasonable multiverse, and the maximal multiverse
Mod(Σ) obviously verify these three conditions. Further desiderata may be imposed.
A more pragmatic demand is to require new candidate axioms to be consistent with any
established maximality-oriented axiom (forcing, large cardinals, not constructibility).
We can describe these by a - possibly ZFC-inconsistent - subset Γ∗ ⊆ Γ of the set of
relevant axioms.
This gives us four syntactic parameters for axiom induction: the background theory
Tˆ , the multiverse specification ΦMV, the relevant axioms Γ, and the established axioms
Γ∗. If we maximize the multiverse (ΦMV = Σ) and presuppose that the inner-model-
consistency assumptions are in Σ, i.e. Γ+ ⊆ Σ, we are left with Tˆ and Γ∗. Because
the part of Tˆ depending on Σ (asking for an inner set model of Σ) is given by Σ, we
may replace Tˆ = TˆΣ by its non-dependent part Tˆ−. Without an obvious reason why
the theory of the background universe should be stronger than necessary relative to Σ,
we could even assume that Tˆ− = ∅.
The most natural way to specify “preferred universes” is to choose them accord-
ing to some partial pre-order on universes based on the theories or the structures of
the models in the multiverse. The natural large cardinal hierarchies, the amount of
horizontal or vertical reflection, the inner-model ordering, and others, which can again
be aggregated in different ways, they all provide pre-orders implementing conceptual
desiderata. So we may assume that axiom induction can also be informed by one or sev-
eral pre-orders  over universes. A simple parameter context would be ∆ = (Γ∗,).
Reasonable inference notions. What do we know about the |∼∈∆ and which principles
should they satisfy? A characteristic of inductive reasoning is its nonmonotonicity: the
addition of new premises may require the retraction of previous conclusions ψ, thereby
invalidating the monotonicity of classical logic. A new axiom ϕ added for extrinsic
reasons to Σ may well reject ψ. Since the early 80s, such defeasible consequence re-
lations have been heavily investigated in AI and applied logic2, where they are used
to model and analyze commonsense reasoning. If axiom induction is just driven by
preorders over the multiverse, the resulting |∼∈∆ are well-behaved preferential conse-
quence relations which verify for instance Cumulativity, a weakening of monotonicity
and transitivity: If Σ |∼ ψ, then Σ |∼ ϕ iff Σ ∪ {ψ} |∼ ϕ.
If this fails, it is possible that two axioms are suggested and can even be consis-
tently added, while adding just one may effectively block the other one. It is at least
questionable whether such an inference notion is able to guide us to any coherent new
axiomatic picture (even admitting the possibility of bifurcation). Cumulativity may
not be a necessary condition for axiom induction, but it is certainly a desirable one.
The situation can easily deteriorate. If we enforce the consistency conditions result-
ing from some Γ∗, then basic principles like Right conjunction, i.e. Σ |∼ ϕ,ψ implies
Σ |∼ ϕ ∧ ψ, are violated as well. By itself, this lack of global coherence is not neces-
sarily tragic because it might be enough if axiom induction produces good individual
candidates. The problem is however that we are dealing with an incremental dynamic
process, where incoherence may stay hidden and the order of addition may affect the
results. An analysis of the abstract properties of these inference mechanisms is there-
fore recommendable to allow a better choice of methods and a better understanding of
the risks of misguided axiom addition.
2D. Gabbay et al. (eds.). Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 3:
Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Uncertain Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
